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According to the accountability principle a person’s fair allocation takes into ac-
count the input-relevant variables she can inﬂuence, like eﬀort, but not the variables
she cannot inﬂuence, like a randomly assigned exogenous factor. This study is based
on a real eﬀort-task experiment, where the exogenous inﬂuence is twofold: it comes
either as a production factor or as a bonus. We conﬁrm that in a base treatment,
i.e in absence of exogenous factors, subjects base their allocation decisions largely on
eﬀort. When exogenous diﬀerences are present behavior changes. Whereas bonuses
are largely ignored and subjects still mostly base their decisions on eﬀort, production
factors render allocations more selﬁsh. Furthermore, we study whether accountability
holds for decisions over opportunities. We apply the so-called lottery-points-method,
where a binary lottery in the last experimental stage allocates the whole amount to
one of the workers. We ﬁnd that subjects claim more for themselves when allocating
opportunities in all treatments.
Keywords: Distributive justice, real eﬀort task, procedural fairness
JEL classiﬁcation: C72, C92
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Monetary incentives are one of the most important factors in the methodology of exper-
imental economics. However, economic experiments usually rely on windfall gains. Con-
trary to that, the real life-situations involving "a cake that nobody has to bake" (Güth
and Kliemt 2003) are rather limited. Distributive behavior changes when the money to
be distributed is earned. When allocating their own rather than other’s money subjects
clearly behave more selﬁsh (Cherry and Shogren 2002, Cherry et al. 2008). However, on
the other hand subjects engage in fairness considerations quite strongly when distributing
not only their own but jointly earned money. Probably the most prevalent notion of fair-
ness in the context of joint production is the Accountability Principle (Konow 1996). It
has its origins in equity theory (Homans 1958, 1961) and attribution theory (e.g. Heider
1958, Rotter 1966), which relate input variables to fair allocations. Attribution theory is
a social psychology theory that claims to explain behavior based on causal attributions of
responsibility. Traditionally equity theory does not discriminate between diﬀerent classes
of input variables. However, for the accountability principle input-relevant factors are dis-
tinguished into discretionary variables, i.e., variables that are under agents’ inﬂuence (e.g.
eﬀort), and exogenous variables, i.e., those variables that are not under agents’ control (e.g.
randomly assigned wage). The accountability principle suggests that the fair allocation of
a joint production should depend only on discretionary variables ignoring those that are
exogenous.
The aim of this study is to investigate the robustness of the accountability principle
as the prevalent fairness ideal in situations involving real eﬀort and joint production. I
look at self-serving behavior, or the "fairness bias", and explore speciﬁcally under which
circumstances subjects are most susceptible to it. To achieve this aim I study distributive
behavior and normative beliefs in diﬀerent conditions. Moreover, I consider both, decisions
over outcomes and decisions over opportunities.
The "fairness bias" has been conﬁrmed in a number of experiments involving hypo-
thetical scenarios. Messik and Sentis (1978) perform a study where they ask subjects to
distribute payments in hypothetical work situations. They ﬁnd that subjects choose the
egalitarian split more often when it is proﬁtable for themselves. They also judge a higher
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et al. (1993) study decisions of hypothetical plaintiﬀs or defendants in case studies, that
are based on actual trials. Subjects are identically informed and have to negotiate in the
role that was given to them. When asked what they considered fair and whether they
agreed with the actual adjudgement both roles were found to engage in self serving esti-
mations. In a follow-up study the authors actually found a causality between engaging in
such biased estimations and bargaining impasse since subjects agreed less with the actual
adjudgements and took longer for negotiation (Babcock et al.1995). However, Babcock
and Loewenstein (1997) report on possible interventions to reduce the fairness bias and
resultant impasse. They ﬁnd that when subjects who already know their roles are informed
on the existence of the self-serving bias and list the weaknesses in their own case, diﬀer-
ences in their estimates of the judge’s award and the occurrence of impasse signiﬁcantly
decrease.
Experimental evidence involving real eﬀort shows similar results. Frohlich et al. (2004)
study dictator allocations in a real eﬀort experiment, involving joint production. They ﬁnd
evidence for both behavior according to the accountability principle and egalitarianism.
Most subjects behave in an egalitarian manner when an allocation according to the ac-
countability principle would be too costly. Subjects adjust behavior to that fairness ideal
that renders them the highest payoﬀ, thus, they engage in a "fairness bias". However,
adjusting behavior is not necessarily conscious (Johansson and Konow 2009). One part
of behavior involves the conscious and selﬁshly motivated deviation from what is believed
to be fair, the so-called self-centered bias. Another part includes the distortion of beliefs
on what is fair in direction towards the subject’s material advantage. This so-called self-
serving bias involves self-deception, i.e. subjects take more than they believe it’s fair but
they believe it’s fair to do so.
Konow (2000) performs an experiment, involving real eﬀort, where he studies devia-
tions from the accountability principle and the decomposition of the fairness bias in into
its conscious and unconscious parts. In several diﬀerent versions of the dictator game
he manipulates either discretionary variables or exogenous variables. He ﬁnds that the
accountability principle is chosen to be fair by detached benevolent dictators on the one
hand but on the other hand that standard dictators don’t conform to it. Deviations are
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self-deception in about 60% of the cases.
In this experiment self-centered and self-deceptive behavior are distinguished by taking
into account normative beliefs. I study how they are aﬀected by the treatment manipula-
tions and how behavior conforms to them. Furthermore, in contrast to Konow (2000) here
discretionary and exogenous variables are varied at the same time and, moreover, the kind
of exogenous diﬀerences is manipulated. In addition to a randomly determined production
factor I look at how subjects behave when the exogenous diﬀerence comes as an additional
ﬁxed amount, i.e., a bonus. Finally, subjects decide on allocations over outcomes as well
as allocations over opportunities to get the beneﬁts of production as a whole.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 elaborates on the experimental design and
procedures. In section 3 several diﬀerent fairness ideals that are applicable in our setting
are presented and their behavioral predictions are derived. Section 4 reports the results.
Section 5 follows with a discussion and concludes.
2 Experimental Design and Procedures
I study distributive choices based on a real eﬀort experiment. Eﬀort is measured via
the number of correct answers in a quiz, that subjects perform in the beginning of the
experiment. The quiz is based on a text that registered subjects had received previous to
the experiment via e-mail. The e-mail was accompanied by the note that the experiment
would start with a quiz based on this text and that earnings in the experiment would
depend partly on their performance in the quiz. I chose a rather speciﬁc topic to ensure that
everybody actually had to prepare the text and nobody could beneﬁt from her respective
ﬁeld of studies. Therefore, the diﬀerent investments of time in the preparation of the text
reﬂected eﬀort.1 After performing the quiz subjects were matched in pairs. Each pair’s
earnings from the quiz went to a joint account. Then subjects made a decision on how to
1The text I used was the Wikipedia entry for Max Planck: http://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Max_
Planck. A similar real eﬀort task, although with a diﬀerent text, was successfully used in Rauhut and
Winter (2010).
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First, I study distributive choices in a base treatment, where all subjects receive the
same ﬁxed amount per correct answer in the quiz. Second, I introduce exogenous diﬀerences
in earnings for which subjects cannot be held responsible, i.e., diﬀerences in wages that are
not eﬀort-linked. In this experiment two kinds of exogenous diﬀerences are distinguished.
One is a diﬀerence in wage, i.e., subjects receive either a low or a high amount per correct
answer in the quiz. Another is a diﬀerence in an additional amount that subjects receive
on top of their (piece-rate) quiz earnings, i.e., either a high or low bonus. Both, production
factors and bonuses, were randomly assigned.
Furthermore, I manipulate a second variable in order to check the robustness of the
results: the mode of allocation. In each treatment each subject makes two decisions, one
on the allocation of the amount on the joint account directly (decision over outcomes) and
one on the probabilities to get the joint account as a whole (decision over opportunities).
Speciﬁcally, subjects were told in the outcome treatments that they together with their
partner had earned an amount of experimental currency units (ECU) in the quiz, which
should be allocated among the two. In the opportunity treatments they were told that
they had earned lottery tickets (LOT), which should be allocated among the two. Since
the quiz was conducted only once in the beginning of the experiment and no rematching
of subjects took place, quiz earnings and thus the size of the joint account, were exactly
the same in both versions. The only diﬀerence was a binary lottery conducted at the end
of the opportunity treatments, which allocated the whole joint amount to one of the two
players according to how lottery tickets were allocated.2 Taking together the ﬁrst (between
subjects) manipulation and the second (within subjects) manipulation the experimental
design results in six treatments. For an overview see table 1.
The course of the experiment was as follows. After receiving general instructions sub-
jects performed the knowledge quiz. The quiz consisted of 25 multiple choice questions and
subjects had 15 minutes time to answer them.3 The instructions concerning the two deci-
2The procedure that is used is the so-called ’Lottery-points-method’ as introduced by Roth and Malouf
(1979). Since subjects earn lottery tickets which they then also distribute they are supposed to update their
expected value/utility. Thus, this method theoretically induces risk neutrality towards the ﬁnal lottery.
3No subject actually needed the whole amount of time available for answering.
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Partners in the quiz have..
T1 ..the same wage. ECU LOT
T2 ..a diﬀerent wage. ECU LOT
T3 ..the same wage, ECU LOT
but get a diﬀerent bonus.
Table 1: Treatment manipulations
Note: between subjects (bs), within subjects (ws)
sion stages were shown to the subjects on the screen in front of them before each decision
was made4. Half of the subjects made their ﬁrst decision in the outcome version (allocation
of ECU), the other half made their ﬁrst decision for the opportunity version (allocation of
LOT). On the decision screens subjects were informed about the total number of correct
answers of the pair and the relative and absolute shares. Furthermore, subjects were in-
formed about the amount of ECU/LOT on the joint account, and again their relative and
absolute shares. A third information concerned their own and their partners’ production
factor, respectively bonus. All the information was supported by pie charts to reﬂect the
relative numbers. In the opportunity versions additional information was provided on the
size of the winner’s prize (the number of jointly earned lottery tickets converted into ECU
1:1). After subjects had entered the number of ECU/LOT they claimed for themselves
a subsequent screen displayed the distribution they were about to make in relative terms
and asked for ﬁnal conﬁrmation. Subjects did not receive any feedback on their partners’
choice between the two decisions. For ﬁnal payment one of the two decisions was chosen
and one of the two subjects was selected at random as dictator. Subjects received feedback
on their earnings, including the actual allocation in ECU or LOT and whether they won
or lost the ﬁnal lottery at the very end of the experiment.
After making their decisions subjects ﬁlled out a post-experimental questionnaire, which
included questions on gender, age and ﬁeld of study, as well as empirical and normative
beliefs (Bicchieri 2006). Furthermore, their risk attitude was elicited in a non-incentivized
way.5 For ﬁlling out this questionnaire subjects received an additional amount of 2.50 €.
4The instructions for this experiment are available in the Appendix.
5For risk elicitation subjects answered the question: How willing are you to take risks in general?
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Germany, using the z-Tree software (Fischbacher 2007) and the E-nstructions software for
electronic visualization of the instructions (Schmelz 2010). Participants in the experiment
were undergraduate students from diﬀerent disciplines who were recruited using ORSEE
(Greiner 2004). None of the participants was informed about the purpose of the experiment
and subjects were allowed to participate only once. After being seated at separate computer
terminals, subjects saw general instructions on the computer screen, that informed them
about the course of the experiment and which were also read aloud by the experimenter.
The experiment included 8 sessions in total, excluding a pilot session that was run in the
videolaboratory of the Max Planck Institute in Jena, but was not used for later analysis.6
The average number of correct answers in the quiz over all sessions was 16.09, with a
minimum of 3, a maximum of 24, and a standard deviation of 4.59. Each session lasted
on average 45 minutes and involved 32, respectively 30, participants. Subjects earned
experimental currency units (ECU), which were transformed into euros at an exchange
rate of 100 ECU=10 €. The average earnings per subject amounted to 10.7 € and ranged
from a minimum of 5.0 € to a maximum of 22.2 €, including the show-up fee of 2.50 €.
3 Theory and Propositions
In this experiment subjects’ eﬀort is measured by the number of correct answers in the
quiz qi, where i 2 f1;2g indicates the subject number in the pair. The earnings per correct
answer are ai = 4 in T1, ai 2 f2;6g in T2, and ai = 2 in T3. Moreover, subjects receive
a bonus, which amounts to bi = 0 in T1 and T2, and bi 2 f15;45g in T3. The individual
earnings per subject then add up to
Xi = aiqi + bi (1)
(Dohmen et al. 2010). Subjects had to indicate their risk attitude on a scale ranging from ‘not at all risk
taking’(0) to ‘very risk taking’(10).
66 out of this 8 sessions, i.e. 2 sessions per treatment, were conducted with a randomized order of the
allocation mode. In the 2 remaining sessions, one for T2 and one for T3, subjects always made their ﬁrst
decision over ECU and their second over LOT. The reason for this was mainly to obtain the necessary
number of observations for analysis in connection with ﬁgure 2. The data from these 2 additional sessions
was used only there.
7
Jena Economic Research Papers 2011 - 004and the amount on the joint account equals
X(a;q;b) = a1q1 + b1 + a2q2 + b2: (2)
In this context several fairness notions are conceivable. The ﬁrst one is the egalitarian
fairness ideal which is probably the oldest and the simplest notion of justice. It implies





The next two fairness ideals are both originated in equity theory, which relates fair al-
locations to so-called inputs (Homans 1961). In an economic context this means that
input-output relations of the involved parties are equal, where usually inputs are thought
of as contributions to an economic exchange (Selten 1978, Güth 1994). If this is taken lit-
erally, in this setting everyone gets what she contributes, which is determined by a mixture
of eﬀort and luck. What I call the meritocratic fairness ideal is then deﬁned as follows:
fmerit = aiqi + bi: (4)
However, predictions depend crucially on what is the perceived input. This leads to the
third fairness ideal, which relies on the Accountability Principle (Konow 1996). Whereas
the meritocratic view takes luck into account, this principle is based only on input-relevant
factors that are under the control of an agent, ignoring those that are not under her
control. Thus, in our setting a fair allocation according to the accountability principle is










Moreover, it is possible that subjects succumb to a fairness bias. They would then con-
sciously or unconsciously adjust their behavior to that fairness ideal that renders them the
highest allocation. Such behavior can be deﬁned as follows:
fbias = max(fegalitarian;fmerit;faccountability) (6)
7If bi > 0 (T3) another formal speciﬁcation of this fairness ideal is possible: faccountability =
qi P
qiX(a;q;b). This alternative speciﬁcation would imply that also those parts of the contribution that are
totally unrelated to the eﬀort, i.e. the bonuses, are split according to relative eﬀort. Since this seems not
in line with the spirit of accountability, I decided for the speciﬁcation stated in equation (5).
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low production factor/bonus condition 1 condition 2
high production factor/bonus condition 3 condition 4
Table 2: Behavioral conditions
However, subjects act as dictators in this experiment. Since dictators have the possibility
to act selﬁshly, it is rather unlikely that subjects’ decisions meet their fairness ideals ex-
actly. This has been shown by other experiments, e.g. Cappelen et al. (2007), which deal
with this concern by estimating a selﬁshness premium for each subject. Instead of taking
the point predictions of the previously deﬁned fairness ideals as a theoretical benchmark
I will refer to the predictions on relative behavior dependent on diﬀerent behavioral con-
ditions. According to the experimental design we can deﬁne four behavioral conditions.
Subjects within one pair diﬀer with respect to their eﬀort and with respect to the exoge-
nous part of their earnings. They exert either more or less eﬀort than the other subject in
the pair and they receive either a high or a low production factor/bonus. A combination
of those possibilities results in the following behavioral conditions in which subjects make
their decisions: low eﬀort and low production factor/bonus, high eﬀort and low production
factor/bonus, low eﬀort and high production factor/bonus, and high eﬀort and high pro-
duction factor/bonus (see table 2).8 Assuming that each subject takes the same selﬁshness
premium on top of what she thinks is the fair amount, on average relative behavior with
respect to the diﬀerent behavioral conditions should not be inﬂuenced. Thus, I state the
following three propositions:
Proposition 1 When behavior follows the egalitarian fairness ideal, subjects claim 50%
of the joint account, independent of the condition in which they decide.
Proposition 2 When behavior follows the meritocratic fairness ideal, subjects in the con-
ditions with low eﬀort and/or with low production factor/bonus claim on average less than
subjects in conditions with high eﬀort and/or high production factor/bonus (condition 1 <
8Since production factors are equal within the pair in T1 we have only two conditions in T1. Observa-
tions where both subjects exerted the exact same amount of eﬀort are excluded from the analysis for all
treatments.
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Proposition 3 When behavior follows the accountability principle, subjects in conditions
with the same eﬀort level claim equally much, and subjects in conditions with low eﬀort
claim less than subjects in conditions with high eﬀort ((condition 1 = condition 3) <
(condition 2 = condition 4)).
As can be seen from these propositions the meritocratic fairness ideal and accountability
principle make qualitatively opposing predictions for behavior in the ‘mixed’ conditions (2
and 3). If subjects succumb to a fairness bias they behave according to the fairness ideal
that renders them a higher payoﬀ.10 Thus, I state the following proposition:
Proposition 4 When behavior is inﬂuenced by a fairness bias, subjects in condition 2
behave according to the accountability principle and subjects in condition 3 behave according
to the meritocratic fairness ideal.
The last proposition concerns the robustness check. As pointed out in the experimental de-
sign section, the lottery-points method that was used to manipulate opportunities induces
risk neutrality. Therefore, we should not ﬁnd any behavioral diﬀerence between decisions
in outcomes and decisions in opportunities.
Proposition 5 Decisions over outcomes and opportunities do not diﬀer.
9The inequality between condition 2 and 3 holds for exerted eﬀort and size of exogenous diﬀerence that
follow from this experiment (see ﬁgure 1 for a graphical representation).
10 From decisions in conditions 1 and 4 one cannot really see whether behavior is inﬂuenced by a fairness
bias, since the diﬀerent fairness ideals don’t lead qualitatively to diﬀerent predictions. Distributive choices
in condition 1 would in any case be lower than distributive choices in the other conditions, and in condition
4 they would always be higher.
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I will start with the analysis of behavior without exogenous diﬀerences (T1), followed by
the diﬀerent production factors (T2) and the diﬀerent bonuses (T3), and test propositions
1 to 4. Then I proceed with analyzing normative beliefs and compare them to actual
behavior. Finally, I analyze decisions over opportunities.
4.1 Accountability and exogenous diﬀerences
Figure 1 shows mean actual, normative and ideal behavior (predicted by the meritocratic
fairness ideal and the accountability principle) for each condition. First of all, it has to
be noted that average behavior in all conditions lies above 50 %. Moreover, as we will
see in the following there are signiﬁcant behavioral diﬀerences between conditions. This
implies that for none of our three treatments the egalitarian fairness ideal seems to be
the main behavioral motivation. In T1, where exogenous diﬀerences are absent, mean
actual behavior in condition 1 (low eﬀort) amounts to 60.27 %. Subjects in condition
2 (high eﬀort) claim on average 74.75 %. Diﬀerences between conditions are signiﬁcant
(p=0.002, all pairwise comparisons throughout the paper are based on Mann-Whitney U-
tests). Subjects with low eﬀort claim less for themselves than subjects with high eﬀort.
Quantitatively actual behavior lies above predictions made by the accountability principle,
which amount to 39.72 % for condition 1 and 60.27 % for condition 2.11 However, since
qualitatively behavior is in line with the predictions, I state the ﬁrst result:
Result 1 In absence of exogenous diﬀerences (T1) on average subjects base their
decision on eﬀort.
In T2, where exogenous diﬀerences are introduced via production factors, behavior
in condition 1 is signiﬁcantly below behavior in condition 3 (p=0.027), and behavior in
condition 2 is below behavior in condition 4 (p=0.045). Thus, even though subjects achieve
11Note that in T1 due to the absence of exogenous diﬀerences the meritocratic fairness ideal and the
accountability principle coincide. Since eﬀort is the only variable in this treatment I refer to the account-
ability principle.
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Note: Data points represent on average 29 (T1), resp. 12 (T2 and T3) decisions.
the same eﬀort level, they allocate higher shares to themselves when they are assigned a
high production factor than when they are assigned a low production factor. Moreover, I
ﬁnd a signiﬁcant diﬀerence between behavior in condition 1 and condition 4 (p=0.004). The
results suggest that exogenous factors inﬂuence decisions. However, there is no diﬀerence
in decisions of the mixed conditions (condition 2 and 3).
When exogenous diﬀerences come as a bonus (T3), decisions in condition 1 are signiﬁcantly
below decisions in condition 3 (p=0.019) but decisions in condition 2 are not below decisions
in condition 4. This suggests that when eﬀort is low subjects distinguish between high and
low bonus, but when eﬀort is high they don’t. Subjects in condition 1 take signiﬁcantly less
than subjects in condition 4 (p=0.074). However, behavior in condition 2 and condition 3
does not diﬀer.
Due to the robustness check (decision over opportunities) half of the decisions considered
so far are made in period one of the experiment and the other half are made in period two.
To exclude an eﬀect of the order of decisions, which will be discussed in more detail in
section 4.3, we will take a closer look on decisions made only in the ﬁrst period (see ﬁgure
2).12 The results described above are even more pronounced. Whereas in T2 the graph
122 additional sessions were conducted, one for T2 and one for T3, with a ﬁxed decision order (ﬁrst
decision over outcomes and second decisions over opportunities).
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Jena Economic Research Papers 2011 - 004Figure 2: Means of actual, ideal and normative behavior (only ﬁrst decisions made over
outcomes)
Note: Data points represent means over on average 12.5 decisions.
has a rather increasing shape and resembles more the meritocratic fairness ideal, we ﬁnd in
T3 that behavior is strikingly similar to what the accountability principle predicts. In T3
we don’t ﬁnd signiﬁcant behavioral diﬀerences between conditions that involve the same
high level of eﬀort (p=0.4289), but a weak diﬀerence between conditions with the same
low eﬀort level (p=0.0248). In T2 decisions in condition 2 are below decisions in condition
4 (p=0.0003), but there is no signiﬁcant diﬀerence between behavior in condition 1 and 3
(p=0.1131). Under the reservation that it might be necessary to collect even more data in
order to test the propositions statistically more profound I state the next results as follows:
Result 2 When exogenous diﬀerences are introduced via production factors (T2)
subjects’ decisions are inﬂuenced by those exogenous diﬀerences, especially when they
exerted a high eﬀort.
Result 3 When exogenous diﬀerences are introduced via bonuses (T3) on average
subjects base their decisions on eﬀort.
13
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Figures 1 and 2 show, besides actual behavior, subjects’ average normative beliefs. When
compared to the three fairness ideals suggested in section 3 we see that there is a striking
similarity of all normative beliefs to the accountability principle. It seems that subjects
have a clear understanding of which behavior is fair in this situation: subjects with higher
eﬀort should get more than subjects with lower eﬀort and external factors should not
dominate. Since belief diﬀerences between conditions with the same eﬀort level are not
signiﬁcant (considering only decisions in period 1), the next result is:
Result 4 Normative beliefs are qualitatively in line with the accountability principle
for all treatments.
When looking at how the beliefs match behavior we see that in T1 normative beliefs
reﬂect behavior almost perfectly in ﬁgure 1 and qualitatively in ﬁgure 2. In T2, when
considering only decisions made in the ﬁrst period, behavior and normative beliefs match,
except behavior in condition 3, which exceeds normative beliefs (p=0.034). In T3 on the
other hand normative beliefs and behavior match almost perfectly.
Result 5 When exogenous diﬀerences come as a production factor behavior in condi-
tions with low eﬀort and a high production factor (cond. 3) exceeds normative beliefs.
4.3 Outcome vs. Opportunity
Figure 3 shows the mean decisions over outcomes (ECU) and opportunities (LOT) with
respect to their order13. ECU-decisions are aﬀected by the sequence of decisions whereas
LOT-decisions are not. When we compare only the ﬁrst decisions of both versions in each
treatment decisions over opportunities lie signiﬁcantly above decisions over outcomes in
T1 (p=0.050) and T3 (p=0.046). Opportunity decisions made in period 1 don’t diﬀer from
opportunity decisions made in period 2. Outcome decisions made in period 1 on the other
13In each treatment half of the decisions made had the order ECU-LOT and the other half LOT-ECU.
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Jena Economic Research Papers 2011 - 004Figure 3: Means of decisions over outcome and opportunities (separated by their order)
Note: Data points represent on average 32 individual decisions.
hand are signiﬁcantly below outcome decisions made in period 2 (p=0.001 (T1), p=0.006
(T2), p=0.004 (T3)). A within subjects analysis supports this ﬁnding. We observe a
diﬀerence between outcome and opportunity decisions made by the same subjects only
in one direction, namely when the ﬁrst decision is over outcomes and the second over
opportunities (opportunity decisions are signiﬁcantly higher with p=0.008 (T1), p=0.009
(T2), p=0.10 (T3)). When looking at behavior dependent on the diﬀerent conditions we
ﬁnd average decisions in LOT to lie above decisions in ECU for all conditions (except
condition 4 in T3). However, diﬀerences in outcome and opportunity decisions cannot
be explained by subjects’ risk aversion. Several OLS regressions run on the ECU and
LOT decisions separately for each treatment show that risk aversion is signiﬁcant only in
T1-LOT where it has negative sign (for the regressions see table 3 in the Appendix.).
Result 6 Opportunity decisions lie above outcome decisions.
In contrast to behavior there is no diﬀerence in normative beliefs between outcomes
and opportunities (see ﬁgure 4). Other than that, conditional behavior in opportunities
is similar to those found for outcomes in T1 and T2. In T3-LOT behavior in condition
3 is higher than in T3-ECU (p=0.027 , only ﬁrst decisions). As a consequence behavior
in condition 3 exceeds normative beliefs in T3-LOT (p=0.050) whereas it conforms to
15
Jena Economic Research Papers 2011 - 004Figure 4: Means of actual, ideal and normative behavior (only opportunities)
Note: Data points represent on average 29 (T1), resp. 12 (T2 and T3), individual decisions.
normative beliefs for T3-ECU.
5 Discussion and Conclusions
I study distributive preferences in a real eﬀort experiment where two subjects contribute
their earnings to a joint account which is then allocated among them via random dictator-
ship. Individual contributions depend on eﬀort and on exogenous factors, that cannot be
inﬂuenced by the subjects. The link between exerted eﬀort and exogenous factor is either
of multiplicative nature, i.e., the exogenous diﬀerence comes as a production factor, or of
additive nature, i.e, the exogenous diﬀerence comes as a bonus. Two versions of the same
game are studied, one where subjects decide over the allocation of outcomes directly and
one where subjects decide over the opportunity to get the whole amount. I elicit normative
beliefs in all treatments and compare it to actual behavior.
Results suggest that normative beliefs are motivated by the accountability principle
in all treatments. Behavior on the other hand deviates from this in the production fac-
tor treatment. Especially aﬀected by the mismatch between behavior and beliefs are the
mixed conditions, where diﬀerent fairness ideals lead qualitatively to diﬀerent predictions.
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portunities. Thus, not only is it dependent on the individual situation who engages in a
fairness bias, but it also varies with the context.
How can this diﬀerence between the production factor and the bonus treatment be
explained? When distinguishing between the two diﬀerent kinds of exogenous diﬀerences
another aspect comes into play: eﬃciency. It is to the advantage of the whole pair when
someone who exerts a high eﬀort gets the high production factor as compared to someone
who exerts a low eﬀort. The former case will increase the pie size compared to the latter
case. The bonus on the other hand is completely unrelated to eﬀort and therefore does
not entail such eﬃciency considerations. It is possible that eﬃciency is the reason why
both sources of exogenous diﬀerence are treated diﬀerently. However, their assignment is
completely arbitrary. Therefore, from a fairness perspective allocational diﬀerences can
hardly be justiﬁed.
The second ﬁnding, the diﬀerence between decisions over outcomes and over oppor-
tunities, relates to previous ﬁndings. Bolton, Brandts and Ockenfels (2005) for instance
perform an experiment where they study proposer and responder behavior in ultimatum
games and battle of the sexes games. In the ultimatum game proposers can choose between
unfair and fair allocations, and they can choose between unfair and fair procedures in the
battle of the sexes games. Whereas responders’ acceptance rates are not inﬂuenced by
whether they are oﬀered an (un)fair allocation or procedure, proposer behavior changes.
Unfair procedures are more often proposed than unfair allocations. Similar results are
found in another study where subjects face initial inequalities in outcomes or opportuni-
ties, which can be compensated for in a later distribution phase (Becker and Miller 2009).
Equalizing behavior is more prevalent when a fair allocation ex post (in the case of out-
comes) can be achieved as compared to the situation where equalizing behavior leads to
an ex ante fair procedure (in the case of opportunities) but to ex post inequality. Other
evidence for the inﬂuence of outcomes and opportunities is Krawczyk and Le Lec (2008).
They compare in probabilistic and deterministic versions of a dictator game how subjects
allocate either the chances to win a prize or the prize itself. They ﬁnd more selﬁsh be-
havior in the probabilistic version, which increases with the size of the prize. One could
be tempted to rationalize those results with subjects’ risk aversion. However, none of the
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seem to decrease when probabilities come into play.
One possible explanation for this decrease could be the reputation that subjects poten-
tially achieve when decisions are made. In the outcome treatments the share that is given
away, respectively kept, is clearly deﬁned. It is therefore obvious whether the dictator be-
haved fair or not. In the opportunity treatments subjects get either everything or nothing.
Therefore, it can never be determined unambiguously whether the dictator behaved unfair
or fair in the allocation of lottery tickets. Social behavior is widely regarded as desirable
and thus people might want to be perceived as social even though they are not (Andreoni
and Bernheim, 2009). Due to the ambiguity in the opportunity setting subjects can take
more than in the outcome setting while still not revealing how unfair they are. This ’rep-
utation eﬀect’ might be less strong in an anonymous laboratory setting on the one hand,
on the other hand it cannot be completely ruled out as a behavioral motivation. However,
further research is needed to support this explanation.
The last main ﬁnding concerns normative beliefs. Normative beliefs in this experiment
are qualitatively in line with the accountability principle, but quantitatively they lie above
it. Also, actual behavior does not meet the predictions of any fairness ideal exactly. Thus,
in a sense I ﬁnd support for the approach of Cappelen et al. (2007) who assume, that
in addition to the amount that the respective fairness ideal predicts, subjects take what
they call a selﬁshness premium. Based on the comparison between actual behavior and
normative beliefs in this experiment I come to the conclusion that some subjects are in
addition to this selﬁshness premium susceptible to a fairness bias. Behavior clearly exceeds
normative beliefs in cases, where predictions of diﬀerent fairness ideals contradict. This
suggests that subjects in this conditions engage in a self-centered bias rather than in self-
deception. Subjects who exerted low eﬀort but were lucky with their exogenous factor
seem to be most susceptible to a self-centered bias. They believe it is fair to take less than
subjects which exerted a high eﬀort but were unlucky with their exogenous factor, but they
don’t do so. Fairness bias can lead to heavy bargaining impasse in real world situations. A
reduction of this problem might be possible by educating the respective parties (Babcock
and Loewenstein 1997). Thus, I believe it is promising to identify the circumstances under
which such a bias occurs to be better able to work against it.
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A Regressions
Dep. variable: Percentage share allocated to self
T1 T2 T3
ECU LOT ECU LOT ECU LOT
const. 75.43*** 81.32*** 72.32*** 72.61*** 81.15*** 71.74***
6.33 7.45 8.20 8.48 7.48 7.99
high_eﬀ 14.26*** 11.54** 10.24** 7.52 4.95 2.64
4.79 5.39 4.70 4.96 4.54 5.11
high_cred 11.52** 9.08* 8.62* 6.84
4.79 5.06 4.56 5.13
decision1 -14.85*** -4.41 -10.31** -3.21 -11.38** -0.55
4.79 5.40 4.70 4.96 4.51 5.08
risk -1.71 -2.46** -0.81 0.69 -1.37 0.33
1.02 1.15 1.07 1.13 1.12 1.26
female 0.62 -1.11 -2.78 -11.95** -10.12** -9.80*
4.92 5.54 4.81 5.07 4.66 5.24
adj. R2 0.2459 0.09866 0.1674 0.1031 0.1853 0.005182
Obs. 58 58 56 56 56 56
*** p < 0:01 ** p < 0:05 * p < 0:1
Table 3: Results from OLS (Standard errors below each coeﬃcient)
Note: High_eﬀ and high_cred are 1 when the subject exerted high eﬀort, respectively, received the high
production factor/bonus. Decision1 controls for the sequence of decisions over outcomes and
opportunities. It is 1 when the decision was made in period 1 and 0 when it was made in period 2. Risk
controls for risk aversion. It takes values from 0 to 10, where 0 indicates the lowest and 10 the highest
degree of risk aversion.
B Instructions
1. General
Welcome and thank you for participating in this experiment! Please read these instruc-
tions carefully. They are identical for all participants. For being in time you will receive
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additional money. How much depends on your decisions in the experiment, as well as on
the decisions of other participants and random moves. All amounts in the experiment will
be displayed in ECU (experimental currency units). All earned ECU will be exchanged
into Euro at the end of the experiment and disbursed in cash according to the following
exchange rate:
10 ECU = 1 €
Please avoid talking to your neighbor from now on. Switch oﬀ your mobile phone if
necessary and remove all unneeded things from your desk. It is important that you act
according to these rules, as otherwise we will have to exclude you from the experiment and
therefore from any payment as well. In case of questions please raise you hand and we will
answer them individually.
In the beginning of the experiment you will take part in a knowledge quiz based on
the text you have received previously via e-mail. The quiz consists of 25 multiple choice
questions and you have 15 minutes to answer them. The better you have prepared the
more money you can potentially earn in this experiment. You are not allowed to look at
the text during the quiz. If we nevertheless mention that you do so you will be excluded
from the experiment, and thus any payment, immediately.
After the quiz the experiment continues with two distinct parts where we will ask you
to make decisions. In those parts you will be matched with one other person. At no point
in the experiment you will learn his/her identity. You will see the instructions for each of
these parts on the computer screen at the beginning of each part. Only one of the two
parts will be selected randomly for ﬁnal payment.
At the end of the experiment you will be asked to ﬁll out a questionnaire. Please answer
this questionnaire carefully.
If you are done with reading this instructions please click on ’Experiment’. During the
experiment you can switch between the experiment and the instructions with the buttons
’Experiment’ and ’Instructions’. If you have any questions please raise your hand.
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In this part of the experiment you get for each correctly answered question in the
knowledge quiz an amount of ECU/lottery tickets.
(Only opportunity treatments: The lottery tickets are valid for a lottery that will be
conducted in the following. The more lottery tickets you own the higher is your chance to
win the lottery.)
You will now be matched with another participant, with whom you share a joint account.
The amounts that you and the other have earned in the quiz go to this account.
In the quiz you could earn 4 ECU/lottery tickets per correct answer. (T1)
In the quiz you could earn either 2 or 6 ECU/lottery tickets per correct answer. It was
decided at random whether you earned 2 or 6 ECU/lottery tickets. (T2)
In the quiz you could earn 2 ECU/lottery tickets per correct answer. Moreover, you receive
an additional amount of either 15 or 45 ECU/lottery tickets, which will also be transferred
to the joint account. It is decided at random whether you get 15 or 45 ECU/lottery tickets.
(T3)
In the following we will ask you to allocate the amount of ECU/lottery tickets that you
and the other person have earned in the quiz together and which is on you joint account.
On the next screen you will learn how many questions you have answered correctly, how
many ECU/lottery tickets are on the joint account and how much each of have contributed.
After having received all these information you are now requested to decide on the
allocation of the amount on the joint account between yourself and the other person.
Please enter in the box ’For me’ how many ECU/lottery tickets of the account you like for
yourself. After that please click on ’Calculate’ and you will see what this implies for the
other person as well as the percentage shares of your allocation. Both you and the other
person will make such a decision. After that one of the two decisions will be chosen at
random and implemented.
(Only opportunity treatments: After all lottery tickets have been allocated we will
conduct the lottery. The winner receives a prize the loser receives nothing. The prize
equals the jointly earned number of lottery tickets in ECU, i.e. in case of 10 jointly earned
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An example:
Possibly you have answered 5 questions correctly and the other participant 8 questions.
Thus, together you have answered 5+8=13 questions correctly.
Therefore, there are 5x4+8x4=52 ECU/ lottery tickets on your joint account. Thereof
you have contributed 20 ECU/lottery tickets and the other participant 32 ECU/lottery
tickets. Assuming that you have allocated 20 % to the other participant and 80 % to
yourself, you will receive 42 ECU/lottery tickets and the other participant 10 ECU/lottery
tickets (in case luck decides that your decision will be implemented). (T1)
Assumed, luck decided that you receive 6 ECU/lottery tickets per correct answer and
the other participant receives 2 ECU/lottery tickets. Therefore, there are 5x6+8x2=46
ECU/lottery tickets on your joint account. Thereof you have contributed 30 ECU/lottery
tickets and the other participant 16 ECU/lottery tickets. Assuming that you have allocated
20 % to the other participant and 80 % to yourself, you will receive 37 ECU/lottery tickets
and the other participant 9 ECU/lottery tickets (in case luck decides that your decision
will be implemented). (T2)
Assumed, luck decided that you receive 45 ECU/lottery tickets in addition and the
other participant receives 15 ECU/lottery tickets in addition. Therefore, there are
5x2+45+8x2+15=86 ECU/lottery tickets on your joint account. Thereof you have con-
tributed 55 ECU/lottery tickets and the other participant 31 ECU/lottery tickets. Assum-
ing that you have allocated 20 % to the other participant and 80 % to yourself, you will
receive 69 ECU/lottery tickets and the other participant 17 ECU/lottery tickets (in case
luck decides that your decision will be implemented). (T3)
(Only opportunity treatment: When the lottery is conducted you will be the winner
in 80 of 100 cases and the other participant in 20 of 100 cases. The prize amounts to
52/46/86 ECU. Assumed you are the winner, then you will receive 52/46/86 ECU and the
other participant will receive nothing.)
If you are done with reading this instructions please click on ’Experiment’. During the
experiment you can switch between the experiment and the instructions with the buttons
’Experiment’ and ’Instructions’. If you have any questions please raise your hand.
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